Labor Market Effects of School Quality: Theory and Evidence by David Card & Alan B. Krueger
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES
LABOR MARKET EFFECTS OF SCHOOL








We are grateful to Aaron Saiger for data assistance.Helpful comments were provided by Julian
Betts, Gary Burtless, Larry Katz and Cecilia Rouse. This researchis supported in part by a grant from the NTCHD. This paper ispart of NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any
opinions expressed are those of the authors and not those of the NationalBureau of Economic Research.
© 1996 by David Card and Alan B. Krueger. Allrights reserved. Short sections of text, not to
exceed two paragraphs, may be quoted withoutexplicit permission provided that full credit,
including © notice, is given to the source.NBER Working Paper 5450
February1996
LABOR MARKET EFFECFS OF SCHOOL
QUALITY: ThEORY ANDEVIDENCE
ABSTRACT
l'his paper presents an overview and interpretation of the literaturerelating school quality
to students' subsequent labor market success. We begin witha simple theoretical model that
describes the determination of schooling and earnings withvarying school quality. A key insight
of the model is that changes in school qualitymay affect the characteristics of individuals who
choose each level of schooling, imparting a potential selection biasto comparisons of earnings
conditional on education. We then summarize the literature that relatesschool resources to
students' earnings and educational attainment. A variety of evidencesuggests that students who
were educated in schools with more resources tend to earn more and havehigher schooling. We
also discuss two important issues in the literature: the tradeoffs involvedin using school-level
versus more aggregated (district or state-level) qualitymeasures; and the evidence on school
quality effects for African Americans educated in the segregated schoolsystems of the South.
David Card Alan B. Krueger
Department of Economics Department of Economics
Princeton University and Woodrow Wilson School
Princeton, NJ 08544 Princeton University and NBER Princeton, NJ 08544
and NBERThe effectiveness of school spending is a critical issuefor public policy. Education is the
single largest component of government spending in the UnitedStates, accounting for 14 percent
of combined federal, state and localgovernment expenditures) In addition, the private sector
makes a major financial contribution to educationthrough private schooling and through the
opportunity cost of students' time in school. Any improvement inthe effectiveness of schools
could have vital implications for the nation's 48 millionschool children, or generate hugesavings
for taxpayers, or both. In the past two decadesthe issue of school quality has takenon even
greater significance, as the labor market rewards to skill have risenand U.S. schools have come
under renewed criticism for failing to meet internationalstandards.
In this paper we present an overview and evaluationof the literature on the impact of
school quality on students' subsequent labor marketsuccess. School quality is measured by the
level of resources available in the school,district, or state where the student grewup, such as
expenditures per student or the pupil-teacher ratio. Achievementis measured by students'
subsequent earnings in the labor market and by their educationalattainment. This approach
contrasts with much of the research on school
quality conducted by psychologists, sociologists
and political scientists, who tend to measure studentachievement by standardized test scores.2
To economists, however, the labor market isa natural yardstick for measuring the effectiveness
of schools. Schools that increase theearnings of their students meet an objective "market test".
In the standard economic model ofschooling (e.g., Becker, 1967), education is treated as an
investment: current resources arespent while the student is in school in anticipation of higher
'See tatistjcal Abstract of the United States:1994 (114th edition), Washington, DC: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Table 4.64.
21f standardized test scores werehighly correlated with economic success, the distinction between test scores
and earnings would be less important. Butmanystudies find only a weak link between standardized tests and
earnings. For example, the addition of test score information to theearnings models reported by Griliches and
Mason (1972, Table 3) improves the R-squared of their modelsby less than one-half of a percentage point. Using
more recent data, Murnane, Willet and Levy (1995, Tables 3 and4) find that adding a math test score raises the
R-squared by 1.7 percentage points fcc men and 4.0percentage points for women. Furthermore, recent research
on the GED test indicates that simply passing the test hasno significant effect on labor market outcomes (Heckman
and Cameron, 1993). These findings underscore theimportance of directly examining labor market outcomes.2
income later in life. This framework lends itself naturally to a consideration of the costs and
benefits of expenditures on school resources. A reduction in the pupil-teacher ratio, for example,
has immediate and readily measured costs. Monetary benefits, if any, are only realized over
students' lifetimes.
We hasten to add, however, that raising students' earnings is not the only measure of the
effectiveness of schools, or the only purpose of schooling. Schools may have other economic
or noneconomic effects that are as important as their effect on earnings (see Haveman and
Wolfe, 1984). For example, Milton Friedman (1962) argued for compulsory schooling and
government-subsidized education because of the presumed positive externalities of an educated
electorate. Nevertheless, in this paper we focus narrowly on the monetary benefits of education.
We begin in Section 1 with a simple theoretical model of school quality, educational
attainment, and earnings that provides a unifying framework for analyzing many of the issues that
arise in the literature. An important intuition arises from this model: if higher school quality
increases the payoff to each additional year of schooling, it may also lead some students to
acquire more schooling. This extra schooling creates a potential "selection" problem, in that the
characteristics of students with a given level of schooling will change with a change in school
quality. Our theoretical model suggests it is important to examine the impact of school quality
on both the payoff to additional years of schooling on students' eventual educational
attainment.
The second section of the paper summarizes previous studies of the connection between
school resources and students' earnings and educational attainment. A variety of evidence
suggests that students who were educated in schools or areas with more resources tend to earn
more once they enter they labor market, holding other factors constant. For example, several
studies have found that the estimated payoff to a year of education increases as the average
quality of schooling in a state increases. Moreover, the earnings premium associated with higher3
quality schooling appears to be greatest for those who have attended school the longest, which
is consistent with the view that school quality is responsible for theearnings differences, rather
than some omitted characteristic of students.
Other evidence based on the variation in school spending at a finer level ofanalysis also
suggests that higher quality schooling is associated with higher earnings. For example, in a
series of studies of army veterans, Paul Wachtel (1975, 1976) founda statistically significant
relationship between district-level expenditures and students' subsequent earnings. A notable
exception to this conclusion is a set of recent studies that focus on the earnings of relatively
young workers from micro data sets, including the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
(NLS-Y). These studies generally find statistically insignificant effects of school resources on
earnings. On this basis, some analysts (e.g. Betts, forthcoming) have concluded that school
resources don't matter. We reconsider the evidence from these studies and reach a somewhat
different conclusion. In particular, we argue that specific aspects of these datasets, including
the young age of the individuals and the relatively small number of observations, make itvery
difficult to obtain precise estimates of any school quality effects. When comparablespecifications
are estimated with NLS-Y and Census data, the estimated school quality coefficients typically are
not statistically different.
Most of the studies surveyed in Section II also suggest that greater school resources are
positively associated with students' educational attainment. For example, this conclusion emerges
from studies that examine the effect of high-school resources on student graduation rates, as well
as from studies that relate years of educational attainment to the average quality of education in
one's state or school district. As suggested by our theoretical model, higher school quality seems
to lead to higher earnings by increasing the payoff per year of schooling, and by encouraging
students to stay in school longer. Reduced form models, which relate earnings directly to school
quality, typically show that a 10 percent increase in educational expenditures per student is4
associated with a 1 to 2 percent increase in the students'eventualannual earnings.
The third section of the paper evaluates the impact of the level of aggregation at which
school resources are measured. Some researchers have argued that estimates based on state-level
or district-level school quality measures are biased toward finding positive effects of school
quality. The tradeoffs involved in using more or less aggregated measures are considered in
some detail. The conclusion of this analysis, and of the studies reviewed in Section II, is that
the level of aggregation does not appear to be an important factor in determining the sign or
magnitude of the relationship between school resources arid either the payoff per year of
education or the level of educational attainment.
In the fourth section of the paper we review the evidence on the effects of school quality
for African Americans who were educated in the segregated school systems of the South. The
quality of schooling available to black children in different states and across different cohorts
varied widely --mainlyfor political and historical reasons. Thus, some of the concerns that arise
in interpreting the correlation between school quality and the subsequent earnings of white
children, such as the role of family background or unmeasured ability factors, are lessened. The
available evidence suggests that the effects of school quality for black workers are very similar
to the effects for white workers, providing support for a causal interpretation of the link between
school resources and student outcomes.
Finally, our conclusion offers some suggestions for additional research that might shed
further light on the effects of school resources on labor market outcomes, and that might help
reconcile the apparent conflict between studies that relate school quality to earnings and those that
focus on test scores.5
I. A Theoretical Model of School Ouality. Education, and Earnings
As a starting point for discussing the labor market effects of school quality it is usefulto
outline a simple theoretical model of individual earnings and schooling determination.Let y1,
represent the earnings of individual i who attended school system s. We defer discussion of the
level of aggregation represented by s: in principle, s refers to the specificset of schools
potentially attended by i. Let E, represent the level of education of individual i. Assume that
log earnings are determined by a simple linear equation:
(1) log y,= a+ bE, + U11,
where a represents a person-specific intercept (person i's "ability"), b,represents the marginal
productivity of schooling acquired from system s, and u,, represents a random term.3 It is
natural to assume that higher quality leads to a higher marginal return to each additionalyear of
schooling, e.g. b, =b(Qj,where Qisa quality index and b'(Q) ￿ 0. In a simple static model,
equation (1) represents the budget constraint facing individual i prior to the choice of a specific
level of education.
To close the model, assume that individual preferences are represented by a utility
function of the form:
(2) U( y11, E,1) = log y.1, -f(E.,),
where f is a quadratic function with a person-specific slope:
f(E,) = + kJ2
Variation in c1 captures differences across people in the "cost" of schooling, associated with
differences in access to funds (Becker, 1967), differences in tastes or family background, or
differences in aptitude for schooling (Spence, 1973).
Maximization of (2) subject to the constraint (1) gives rise to the optimal schooling
3We abstract from differences in the structure of earningsacross labor markets, such as higher or lower levels
of earnings for all workers, or differences in the return to education.6
choice:
(3) E, =(b,-c1)/k
In this very simple framework, Jiofthe variation of schooling outcomes within a particular
school system is attributable to differences in the cost of schooling. A more general model
would allow for idiosyncratic differences in the return to schooling, possibly in combination with
decreasing returns to schooling (as in Becker, 1967). As discussed in Card (1995), however,
most of the literature on earnings and schooling can be reconciled within the simplified
framework of (1) and (2), ignoring person-specific components in the return to education.
Equations (1) and (3) form a simple model of schooling and earnings with several
important implications for analyzing the effect of school quality. Observe that the conventional
OLS estimate of the return to schooling for individuals educated in system s has the probability
limit
(4) p1= b-k•r,
where r represents the (theoretical) regression coefficient of a1 on C1. The OLS estimate of the
return to schooling for people who attended school system s differs from the true productivity
effect b, by an "ability bias" component: if aj and c1 are negatively correlated (so that people with
lower costs of schooling tend to have higher levels of earnings, regardless of their schooling
choice), then p1willbe upward-biased as an estimate of b. Nevertheless, if the joint distribution
of a and c1 is the same across school systems, then the ability bias component is constant, and
estimates of the relationship between b and Qcanbe obtained by studying the relationship
between pandQacrossschool systems.
Higher school quality in this model increases the slope of the observed relationship
between log earnings and schooling. If schooling and ability are positively correlated, however,
then higher quality also lowers the intercept of this relationship.4 The reason for this is that an
4This pointwas raisedby Lang (1993) in the context of a more complex model of schooling.7
increase in b1 leads all individuals to increase their schooling. For example, consider people who
would acquire only the minimum level of schooling when faced with a given level of school
quality (i.e., a given b1). With higher school quality, some individuals in this group with the
lowest costs of schooling will acquire an additional year of schooling. If costs and ability are
negatively correlated, this shift will lower the average ability of those with who remain at the
minimum level of schooling, causing the intercept of the earnings-schooling relationship to fall.
Formally, the conditional expectation of individual ability given observed schooling and
b1 is
E(aIE1,b1) =constant+ r1(b-k.E,1),
which is a decreasing function of b if r1 < 0. Thus the theoretical regression function that
relates log earnings to schooling (conditional on b1) is:
E(log yIE, bJ =E(ajlEc,,b,) + b1E,,,
=constant+ (b -kç)E11.
A rise in Qlowersthe intercept and raises the slope of this function, as illustrated in Figure 1.
The cross-over point occurs at the level of education E =-r.5For example, if we assume that
a and c1 are normally distributed, and calibrate the model so that the standard deviation of
education is 3.3, the standard deviation of log earnings is 0.50, the average level of education
is 12, and ability bias leads to a 20 percent upward bias in the OLS estimate of the return to
schooling, then the cross-over occurs between 9 and 10 years of education.
Examination of Figure 1 leads to three observations regarding the measurement of the
earnings gains associated with higher school quality. First, higher school quality does not
necessarily lead to higher average earnings conditional on education. If schooling and ability are
positively correlated, an increase in school quality may be associated with lower average earnings
51f r =0, schooling and ability are uncorrelated and an increase mQ, rotates the earnixigs-schooling relationship
at the origin.8
at low levels of education, and little or no effect on average earnings at intermediate levels of
schooling. A second and related observation is that evaluations of school quality based on
samples that exclude highly-educated workers may understate the true effects of higher quality.
Third, measures of the effect of school quality on the of the earnings-schooling relationship
may capture only part of the benefits of higher quality. If schooling is endogenously determined,
a full assessment of the effect of school quality should compare the unconditional distributions
of earnings associated with high and low quality school systems.
IL Summary of the Literature
The empirical economics literature has focused on two main questions concerning
education and earnings. The first, and most widely studied, concerns the interpretation of the
correlation between education and earnings. The second, and less widely studied, is how factors
like school spending affect the relationship between schooling and earnings. Although the focus
of this paper is on the second question, it is helpful to begin with a brief overview of the
literature on the first.
p.TheReturn to Years of Education
The finding that average earnings are higher for individuals with more schooling is one
of the most strongly established facts in social science. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship
between weekly earnings and years of schooling, using data on the (adjusted) mean log weekly
wage of three birth cohorts of white men from the 1980 Census.6 The figures show that
earnings rise almost linearly with years of education, for education beyond a minimal threshold
(corresponding roughly to the second percentile of the education distribution). There are dips
6These figures are from Card and Krneger (1992a). The log earnings have beenadjusted for marital status,
experience, state of residence, and residence in an SMSA.9
at 11 and 15 years of schooling, and a jump at the 16th year, suggesting the presence of "sheep
skin" effects. Thus, a linear model of log earnings and education provides a reasonable
description of the data, although formal goodness-of-fit tests will reject linearity with large
enough samples.7 Because of its relatively good fit, and its close connection to simple
theoretical models (e.g. Mincer, 1974 and Willis, 1986), the log-linear functional form has
dominated the empirical literature. Most estimates indicate that the marginal return per year of
schooling is in the range of 6-10 percent, with a trend toward increasing returns during the 1980s
(e.g., Levy and Murnane, 1992).
A vast literature has investigated the relationship between earnings and years of schooling
with the aim of understanding the forces behind the positive association between earnings and
years of education. The early wave of these studies tried to explicitly control for individuals'
characteristics, such as IQ and parental education (see Griliches, 1977). A second set of studies
compares identical twins with different levels of education to control for family background and
genetic characteristics (see Behrman et aL, 1980, Ashenfelter and Krueger, 1994, and Miller,
Mulvey, and Martin, 1995). Yet another strand of this literature has tried to estimate the
monetary payoff to schooling by comparing workers who obtained different levels of education
for reasons having little to do with innate abilities or background characteristics, such as those
who are compelled to stay in school longer because of compulsory schooling laws (see Angrist
and Krueger, 1991). Finally, estimates of the return to schooling and schooling choices derived
from structural econometric models tend to be similar to, or greater than, the simple OL.S
estimates (e.g., Willis and Rosen, 1979).
Our interpretation of this literature is that additional years of schooling tend to lead to
higher earnings, and that this relationship results primarily from the extra schooling itself rather
7Using a Box-Cox procedure, Heckmanand Polachek (1974) findthat earnings and schooling have an
approximately log-linear relationship. See Solon and Hungerford (1987) and Park (1994) for further evidence on
sheepskin effects.10
thanextraneousfactors.Omitted factors, such as imperfectly measured ability, may bias the
OLS estimate of the return to education upward, but our readingofthe evidence is that the bias
is on the order of just 10-20 percent. Moreover, measurement error in reported education
appears to bias the OLS estimate down by roughly the same magnitude. Thus, these two
potential sources of bias appear to us to approximately cancel out.8 Interestingly, Zvi Griliches
(1977) reached essentially the same conclusion in his Presidential Address to the Econometric
Society nearly two decades ago.
b. School Quality and Earnings
The literature on school quality and earnings is much less voluminous than the literature
on years of education and earnings. This is partly due to data limitations. Studies of school
quality must combine data on the quality of schools that workers attended, or could have
attended, with data on their labor-market outcomes. In the literature, school quality is typically
measured by expenditures per pupil, or by school resources such as the pupil-teacher ratio and
teacher pay. In reviewing the literature, we focus on expenditures per pupil as an index of
school quality. We also summarize the evidence on the effect of the pupil-teacher ratio, because
this is the policy variable typically of interest to decision-makers9, and because variation in the
pupil-teacher ratio accounts for close to one-half of the variability in total expenditures per
student)° Some of the conclusions may hold for other measures of school resources, such as
average teacher pay, but we do not extensively review the evidence here.
8This evidence is reviewed in Card (1995).
9For example, the Nevada legislature passed a law in 1990 lowering the pupil-teacher ratio in the first three
years of primary school for all schools in the state.
t0While differences in the pupil-teacher ratio account for 43 percent of the vanation in total expenditures per
student across school districts, differences in average teacher salary account for only about 8 percent. These
calculations pertain to New Jersey; we thank Cecilia Rouse for providing them.11
The research on earnings and school quality can be divided into four general classes of
studies, based on the statistical model used to link school quality to earnings." The first class
of models simply adds school quality variable(s) to the right hand side of a conventionalwage
equation that also controls for education, experience, and other worker characteristics. The
typical model estimated in such "Class I" models is:
(5) Y1, = + pE + 0Q1 +
where y,, represents the logarithm of earnings of worker i who was educated in schoolsystem
s; X, is a set of covariates such as experience, region of residence dummies, and marital status;
E represents years of education, Qisa measure of the quality of schooling (e.g., expenditures
per student) in school system s, measured at the state, school district, or school level; andis
a random error term. The parameter 0measuresthe effect of a unit change of school quality on
log earnings. Notice that this specification implies that school quality has the same impact on
expected earnings, regardless of the individual's education level.
A second class of models recognizes that school quality may influence the education slope
as well as the intercept of the earnings function. These specifications are more consistent with
the theoretical model in the previous section, in that school quality has a potentially larger effect
on individuals' earnings if they stay in school longer. A typical statistical model in such "Class
U" studies is:
(6)
where all variables are defined as above. In this model, the parameter 0measuresthe impact
of school quality on the intercept of the earnings function, while the parameter measures the
impact of school quality on the slope of the earnings-education relationship. If school quality has
no effect on educational attainment, the effect of a unit change in school quality on the log wage
of individuals with E years of schooling is 0+ E.If school quality affects educational
11For a less technical presentation of this material, see Card andKneger (1995).12
attainment, the total effect of school quality is 0+ (p+'Q)•aE/aQ, where the third term
reflects the marginal effect of a change in school quality on educational attainment (8E/aQ).
A third class of studies focuses on estimating the impact of school quality on the slope
of the return to education (the parameter ),havingabsorbing any level effect of school quality
(0Q1) by including unrestricted dummies for the areas where individuals went to school. This
approach enables researchers to control for differences across labor markets in the average level
of earnings (through market-specific intercepts for the place of work), as well as for differences
in the rate of return to education across local labor market (through market-specific interactions
with education). In these models the school quality effectis identified by comparing earnings
of individuals who were educated in one locale and observed working in another. In Card and
Krueger (1992a), for example, we implement a two step variant of such a model. In the first
step we estimate the return to education for individuals from each state of birth and cohort with
the following model:
(7) Y = & + ++ (y+ Prc)ijbc+ Eijbc,
where i indexes individuals, jrepresentsthe state where the individual currently lives and works,
b represents the state where the individual was born (and by assumption, was educated), and c
represents a birth cohort. This model includes unrestricted state-of-birth intercepts for each
cohort (&)aswell as unrestricted state-of-residence intercepts for each cohort (j).Themodel
also allows the rate of return to education to differ across regions of residence (r) by cohort (the
pinteractions).The key parameters are the state-of-birth-specific rates of return to education,
estimated separately for each cohort (-y).
In the second stage, we relate the returns to education for each state of birth and cohort
to state-level school quality measures and other variables using Generalized Least Squares (GLS):13
(8)=b + a +
wherebrepresentsan unrestricted state-of-birth effect in the return to education, arepresents
an unrestricted cohort effect, Q,,representsaverage school quality at the time cohort c attended
school in state b, and W is a vector of state-of-birth-by-cohort level variables suchas the
average education of parents. As in equation (6), the parametermeasuresthe effect of school
quality on the slope of the earnings-education gradient. Unlike equation (6), however, any effect
of school quality on the intercepts is absorbed by the unrestricted state-of-birth effects in the first
step model. Notice that this model could also be estimated in one step by substituting equation
(8) into equation (7). The two-step estimator, however, is asymptotically unbiased and efficient
if proper OLSweightsare used in the second step.'2 Moreover, the two-step approach is
computationally attractive, and allows researchers to easily investigate the robustness of any
relation between school quality and the return to education.
Finally, some studies have estimated a fourth class of models: reduced form relationships
between earnings and school quality, without conditioning on educational attainment. These
"Class IV" models are of the form:
(9) Y,=+iO+€,.
Because this model excludes educational attainment, the parameter ireflectsboth the direct effect
of school quality on earnings, and any indirect effect of school quality on earnings via its effect
on educational attainment. One limitation of these models (compared to Class ifi models) is that
they do not control for cohort-specific unobserved factors associated with the area in which an
individual was educated: unrestricted place-of-birth effects would absorb the school quality
}) (1974).14
variables.
Table 1 summarizes 24 estimates of the effect of school spending on earnings from 11
different studies. The estimates are derived from 8 independent data sets and 16 mutually
exclusive subsamples. We selected the set of studies in the table by searching the Journal of
Economic Literature index, and by examining citations in known papers and past issues of
selected education journals. We included only those studies that report information on their
coefficients and standard errors, in order to evaluate the power of the estimates.'3 The table
reports estimated elasticities of earnings with respect to spending per student. For example, if
a study regressed log earnings on log expenditures per student, we simply report the estimated
expenditure coefficient. For studies that estimate log-linear models, we convert the coefficient
estimate to an elasticity using mean spending per student.'4 The table also gives a description
of the data and model the study used, and a designation of the class of model corresponding to
the discussion above. Inevitably, there is some arbitrariness in the construction of such a
summary table, but we have tried to include the estimates that were highlighted by the authors.
All 24 of the estimates in Table 1 show a positive effect of additional school spending on
subsequent earnings. The odds of this happening purely by chance are less than 1 in 16 million.
Of course, it is possible that many of the studies find a positive effect of school quality for
spurious reasons (e.g., omitted variables), but one can clearly rule out chance as an explanation
t3Furthermore, if an author published more than one article using the same data set to estimate a similar
empmcal specification, we only report results from one of the articles in Table 1, usually the most recent one. The
table also is limited to studies of U.S. data. See Behrman and Birdsafl (1983) for a study of the effect of school
quality on students subsequent income in Brazil.
14 study, Jud and Walker (1977), regressed the level of earnings on the level of expenditures per student.
The eLasticity for this study was calculated at the mean earnings in the sample, and at the mean expenditure per
enrolled student for 1969-70,asreported in the Digest of Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education, 1994.15
for the consistent finding that more resources are associated with higher earnings. Most of the
studies that report sufficient data to calculate a t-ratio for the estimate have statistically significant
coefficients.Betts (forthcoming) similarly finds that 16 of 21 estimates have statistically
significant effects of expenditures per pupil at the 10% level (see his Table 2).
The mean of the estimates in Table 1 (taking the midrange for Link, Ratledge and Lewis,
1980) is 0.152, and the median is 0.125; the interquartile range is 0.085 to 0.195) The
consistency across studies is impressive in view of the fact that many use different data sets or
samples, estimate varying specifications, and include different sets of control variables.
All of the estimates represented in Table 1 control for education, and are either Class I
models or Class II models. Many of the studies also control for differences in family
background, by including father's education, family income, IQ, or the Armed Forces Qualifying
Test score. Questions could be raised about many of the specifications used in the literature.
For example, it does not seem appropriate to us to include occupation dummies as explanatory
variables, as Tremblay (1986) has done, because more and higher quality education may enable
people to obtain jobs in better paying occupations. More generally, the functional forms used
in some of the studies are open to question.
Despite the varying sets of control variables and specifications used in the literature, it
is possible that the estimated school quality coefficients reflect the influence of omitted factors,
rather than the true effect of school resources. In our view, the most important omitted variables
are likely to be measures of family background and characteristics of the areas where individuals
attended school. An important motivation for the Class II and Class HI models is that many of
The unweighted mean elasticity in Bettss Table 2 is 0.121.16
these omitted variables are absorbed by state of birth effects (or by the quality "main effect" in
the Class II models), while still identifying the effect of school quality on the rate of return to
education.
Estimates of the elasticity of students' earnings with respect to the pupil-teacher ratio (or
teacher-pupil ratio) are summarized in Table 2.16 The models underlying these estimates are
either Class IV reduced form-models that exclude education or (for Grogger, 1994) Class I
models that condition on educational attainment. For comparability across studies, log-linear
coefficient estimates were converted to elasticities by assuming 17.9 students per class (or 1/17.9
for the teacher-pupil ratio).'7 Specifically, if T is the coefficient on the pupil-teacher ratio in
a log wage regression, a point elasticity iwascalculated as= i (17.9).Notice that a log-
linear specification implies a larger proportionate effect of the pupil-teacher ratio for larger class
sizes. Thus, as average class sizes have shrunk in recent decades, these models would imply a
lower elasticity of earnings with respect to changes in the pupil-teacher ratio.
All the studies except Grogger (1994) find that a lower pupil-teacher ratio is associated
with higher earnings, although oniy two are statistically significant. The four negative estimates
have an average elasticity of -0.053,andare all fairly close. A notable pattern that emerges
from Table 2 is that the two recent studies, by Betts (1995) and Grogger (1994), find statistically
insignificant effects. These studies have two features in common: they analyze relatively small
micro data sets of young workers, and they use quality data from the worker's high school.
Although Betts (1995) has argued that the weaker school quality effects in these two studies arise
16inTable 1, we summarize only those studies that report both a coefficient estimate and standard error (or
t-statistic) for the pupil-teacher variable.
17A pupil-teacher ratio of 17.9 was selected for comparability to the NLS-Y.17
from the use of school-level quality data, we suspect that the insignificant findings are mainly
a result of the age and sample sizes of the data sets.
In the NLS-Y sample used by Betts (1995), the average age of workers is 23; theaverage
age in Grogger's HSB sample is similar. The youthfulness of the sample in studies of school
quality is a potential problem for at least two reasons. First, many determinants of labor market
performance are only revealed with experience. For example, it is widely acknowledged that the
return to the quantity of schooling is understated among very young workers (Mincer, 1974).
One might expect a similar understatement of the effect of school quality in the first few years
of the work career. Indeed, this assumption approximately holds in Wachtel' s (1976) comparison
of returns to school quantity and school quality for the Thorndike-Hagen sample of veterans in
1955 and 1969. Between 1955 and 1969, as the average age of the sample rose from 32 to 46,
the rate of return to education rose from 0.030 to 0.079 (163 percent), while the "return" to
school quality (measured as the coefficient of school expenditures per pupil in a Class I
regression model) rose from 0.291 to 0.684 (135 percent). Second, samples of young workers
tend to under-represent individuals of a given age with higher education. If higher school quality
leads individuals to acquire more education, such samples will contain too few earnings
observations for individuals from higher-quality schools, leading to an understatement of any
school quality effects.
The small sample sizes of the NLS-YandHSB data sets make it potentially difficult to
detect small but economically significant effects of school quality. Moreover, the set of models
t8Using Saiger and Irwin's NLS-Y sample and a cumulative experience measure similar to the one used by Betts
(1995), we estimate that the rate of return to schooling in the NLS-Y data set is 4.5 percent --farbelow generally
accepted estimates of the return to schooling in the 1980g. Murnane, Willet and Levy (1995) report a similarly low
estimate of the return to a year of schooling for men in the 1986 High School and Beyond Survey: 4.4 percent.18
that canbe estimated intheNLS-Y or HSB is limited. For example, Heckmanetal. estimate
earnings models that include about 400 parameters, capturing subtle differences across states and
cohorts in the level of earnings and the return to schooling. Models of this complexity cannot
be precisely estimated with samples of only one or two thousand individuals.'9
In light of these features it is interesting to compare the estimated school quality effects
from the micro-level data sets to the estimates in the other literature. The reduced form models
in Betts (1995, Table A-4) and Card and Krueger (1992a, Table 6) are the most comparable
estimates in the two studies. Using the NLS-Y data, Betts estimates a reduced form model that
excludes education and its interactions, and controls only for age, marital status, and region of
residence. As shown in Table 2, this model yields an earnings elasticity of 0.043 (t= 1.70) at
the mean teacher-pupil ratio. The 95% confidence interval for this estimate runs from -0.01 to
0.09. The comparable elasticity evaluated at the same mean class room size in a similar reduced
form model from our 1992a study is 0.074.20 Thus, for comparable specifications, the NLS-Y
data yield results that arestatistically distinguishable from estimates derived from Census data
using state-level school quality data, although the confidence interval based on the NLS-Y is
19A third aspect of the NLS-Y and HSB data sets is the range of variation in measured school quality. The
variance of measured quality across schools in either data set is relatively wide —comparable to thehistorical
variability of quality measures across states. For example,thevariance in the pupil-teacher ratio forwhitemen in
the NLS-Y is 16.6, compared with a variance of17.5 acrossstates and cohorts in our 1992a paper. However, the
observed variances ofschoolquality in the HSB and ?'LS-y may overstatethetnie variability of school quality
across individuals since the quality measures pertain to just a single year ofhighschool, and may also contain
measurement errors.
flic reduced form equations in our 1992a paper include essentially the same covanates. The reason for
conditioning on age, rather than experience, is that experience is a function of educational attainment; workers with
less education have more opportunity to gain work experience. Because the reduced form equations are intended
to capture all direct and indirect effects of school quality (including educational attainment), we believe it is
appropriate to condition only on age. When Bests controls for experience (measured by cumulative weeks of work)
instead of age, the reduced form coefficient is less than half as large.19
relatively large.2'
In a replication of Betts's study, Saiger and Irwin (1995) also estimate a reduced form
model with the NLS-Y data, using the pupil-teacher ratio rather than the teacher-pupil ratio.
Their point estimate of the elasticity of earnings with respect to the pupil-teacher ratio evaluated
at the mean is 0.05 (t=0.52): the associated 95%confidenceinterval is huge, ranging from -0.14
to 0.24. Moreover, adjusting their standard errors for the fact that the NLS-Y sample includes
repeated earnings observations for the same individuals increases the width of the confidence
interval.
c. School Ouality and the Return to Education
Focusing on the impact of school quality on the iQ of the earnings-education
relationship may reduce the bias attributable to omitted variables, since these factors will
primarily affect the estimate of the "main effect" of school quality on the of earnings, or
be absorbed by unrestricted state-of-birth effects. Table 3 summarizes the available estimates of
the effect of the pupil-teacher ratio on the slope of the log earnings-education relationship. The
table reports the change in the percentage return to a year of education for a proportionate
change in the pupil-teacher ratio. The studies by Heckman et al. and our two studies implement
a Class III two-step estimation procedure with state-level data; Betts uses a one-step Class II
argues that estimates from the NLS-Y can reject comparable estimates of the effect of the teacher-pupil
ratio on earnings from the earlier literature. However, he reaches this conclusion by comparing Class III estimates
from Card and Krneger (1992*) to estimates of a restricted Class It model in the NLS-Y data that excludes the
teacher-pupil main effect. The state-of-birth effects in our model (and in Heckman et at.) absorb any direct effect
of Q. The standard error of is over 6 times greater in Betis's model that includes the main effect for the teacher-
pupil ratio than in the restricted model.20
model with high-school level quality data.22
When state-of-birth effects are omitted from the models estimated by us and by Heckman
et al. (column 1), the pupil-teacher ratio tends to have a statistically insignificant effect on the
return to education, but when state effects are added (column 2) the effect is statistically
significant. In other words, the Census samples Qnjyshowa systematic effect of the pupil-
teacher ratio on the return to education when permanent differences in the rate of return to
schooling across states are taken into account (through the cr's in equation 8). It is interesting
to note that Betts' s GLS estimate from the NLS-Y shows a relatively strong effect of the pupil-
teacher ratio on the return to education, even though his model does not control for permanent
state effects. Indeed, his GLS estimate of based on school-level quality data is larger than the
estimates based on Census earnings data with state-level quality measures, although his OLS
estimate for the same model has the opposite sign.
The estimates in Table 3 only pertain to the JQ of the education-earnings relationship.
Corresponding estimates of the effect of the pupil-teacher ratio on the intercepts are often
positive, suggesting that varying class sizes are associated with a rotation of the relationship, as
predicted by our theoretical model. Estimates from Census data in our 1992a study and in
Heckman et al. suggest that the cross-over" point of this rotation is about 12 years of education.
The GLS estimates of the intercept effects reported by Betts (1995) imply a slightly higher point
&ur estimates for Betta are taken from his Table I column 1 (for the OLS estimate), and from his Appendix
Table A3, column 1, for the GLS estimate. Betts uses the teacher-pupil ratio, rather than the pupil-teacher ratio.
Thus, we first convert his estimate of the effect of the teacher-pupil ratio on the return to education into an elasticity
(bymultiplyingby0.059=1/17),andthenmultiply by -100 to obtain the elasticity of the percentage return to
education with respect to the pupil-teacher ratio.
We are uncertain why the GLS estimate is so different from the OLS estimate. In principle, both estimates
have the same probability limit.21
of rotation (14.2years),while Betts's OLSestimatesimply a rotation in the opposite direction
(although the coefficients in the OLS model are insignificant). We discuss the interpretation of
this rotation effect in more detail below.
Although not included in our summary table, Lang (1993) also uses the NLS-Y data set
to estimate the effect of school quality on the slope of the education-earnings relationship. His
estimates, derived from a pair of non-linear equations with cross-equation restrictions, indicate
that a reduction of the pupil-teacher ratio increases the education slope and lowers the intercept
of the earnings function. Both of these effects are statistically significant at the 0.05 level.
However, the reduction of the intercept dominates the steeper slope at all reasonable levels of
education, suggesting that school quality has a negative effect on earnings conditional on any
level of education.
It has been argued (e.g. Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor, 1995) that the use of aggregated
quality data leads to an over-statement of school quality effects. In this regard, the estimates
reported by Betts (1995) using school-level and state-level quality measures are informative. The
OLS estimate of the elasticity of the education slope with respect to the state-average pupil-
teacher ratio is 5.30, compared to 0.50 using the school-level pupil-teacher ratio. Both of these
estimates are NwrongsignedN for the hypothesis that higher school quality raises the return to
schooling. If anything, however, the estimate based on aggregate data under-states rather than
over-states the effect of class size on the education slope relative to the estimate based on school-
level data. In Section IV we present a more detailed discussion of the tradeoffs involved in using
aggregated versus school-level quality measures.
Lastly, we note an interesting study that is not included in this table by Brattsberg and22
Terrell (1995). These authors use 1980 Census data to estimate 58separatereturns to education
for immigrants living in the U.S. based on their country of origin.24 They then relate these
estimated returns to characteristics of the home countries, including the pupil-teacher ratio, an
index of teacher pay, educational attainment, GNP per capita, income inequality, distance from
the U.S., region dummies, and political variables. The paper finds a statistically significant
relationship between the pupil-teacher ratio and the return to education, and between the teacher
wage and the return to education, both with their expected signs. For example, the elasticity
with respect to the pupil-teacher ratio is -0.80 (standard error =0.17). Although it is unclear
whether this estimate should be compared to the estimates in column 1 or 2 of Table 3,
Brattsberg and Terrell's study provides suggestive evidence that immigrants from countries with
higher quality schools have higher returns to education in the U.S. labor market. A potential
limitation of this study is that differential selection biases may lead to differences in the returns
to education for immigrants from different countries that are not attributable to school quality.
d. School Ouality and Educational Attainment
The evidence in the preceding section suggests that improved school quality is associated
with a steeper slope for the return to education function. As discussed in Section 1, an increase
in the payoff to a year of education would also be expected to induce students to stay in school
longer and increase their educational attainment. We do not attempt an exhaustive survey of the
empirical literature on this prediction, but our reading of the literature suggests that the evidence
is consistent with this hypothesis. For example, over half of the studies in Betts's Table 10 find
raise the likelihood that the immigrants were educated abroad, the sample is restricted to those who were
at least 25*1 the time they emigrated to the U.S.23
a statistically significant relationship between the pupil-teacher ratio and educational
attainment.
Nevertheless, Betts (forthcoming) questions the conclusion that school resources affect
educational attainment. Like Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor (1995), Betts argues that studies of
the link between school resources and schooling outcomes that use aggregated quality measures
are biased toward finding a positive quality effect. While we consider this argument in more
detail in the next section, we note that it runs counter to the results in Sander (1993). Sander
relates high school graduation rates to the pupil-teacher ratio across 154 illinois school districts.
In 86 of the districts there is only one high school, so estimates for this sub-sample are equivalent
to school-level estimates. If the level of aggregation matters, then one would expect an
insignificant relationship in the subsample of single-school districts. Sander reports that the
estimates are quite similar in single-school districts and the full sample: a 10 percent decrease
in the pupil-teacher ratio is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the graduation rate
in the single-school subsample, and a 1.4 percentage point increase in the full sample.
Two other recent studies are also inconsistent with the conclusion that school quality has
no effect on educational attainment if quality is measured at the school level. First, Lang (1993)
finds a statistically significant relationship between educational attainment and high school quality
with the 1988 wave of the NLS-Y. Second, Boozer (1993) finds generally positive effects of
smaller class size on the drop out rate for whites and blacks in the National Educational
Longitudinal Survey and in the High School and Beyond data sets. In three of four subsamples
Additiona1ly, Ribar (1993) finds a positive association between state-level expenditures per student and high
school graduation rates for women in the NLS-Y, and Murray, Evans and Schwab (1995)finda significant
relationship with district level data for 15 states using Census data.24
thathe examines,a lower pupil-teacher ratio is significantly associated with a lower drop out
rate.26
Oneofthe older studies using disaggregated quality data that finds an insignificant effect
on educational attainment, by Wachtel (1975), deserves further comment. Individuals in this data
set, the Thorndike-Hagen data, were selected in part on the basis of their education. The sample
has an extremely high level of average education for the cohort of men involved, averaging over
15 years. Thus, it may not be too surprising that this sample shows an insignificant effect.27
In interpreting the relationship between educational attainment and resources per student,
it is worth noting that the observed correlation between these variables may give a downward-
biased estimate of the true effect of per-capita spending on educational attainment. To see this
point, consider an increase in enrollment in a particular district or state induced by a change in
family background or tastes for education. The rise in enrollment will tend to raise the pupil-
teacher ratio and depress spending per student, unless school taxes and the number of teachers
are increased in proportion to the new enrollment. Thus unobserved taste factors or family
income changes that lead to variation in enrollment rates across districts or states could
spuriously induce a negative correlation between educational attainment and per-student
expenditures. This conclusion may be reversed, of course, if a rise in interest in education leads
to a rise in enrollment and a greater than proportional increase in taxation and spending.
In summary, we believe that the literature generally supports the hypothesis of a positive
link between school quality and educational attainment. Although it is unclear whether this
26 subsample shows a significant effect with the opposite sign. The use of sample weights that adjust for
non-random attrition has an important effect on Boozer's estimates from the HSB data set.
27We thank Paul Wachtel for bringing this to our attention.25
relationshiparises because students respond to the economic incentives created by a shift in the
return to schooling, or because they find it more enjoyable to attend schools with smaller classes
or better-paid teachers, the relationship seems to exist.
e. Heckman. Layne-Farrar. and Todd
In their 1995a paper, Heckman et al. extend the third class of models described above in
many important directions. Table 4 summarizes the main features of their analysis and their
principle findings. First, they estimate a variant of Card and Krueger's (1992a) two-step model
using data from the 1970, 1980 and 1990 Censuses. Their variant allows the return-to-education-
by-state-of-birth coefficients in equation (7) to also vary by region of residence, as follows:
(7') Y =+,u. + + +
In the first step of their analysis they estimate some 1,323 (=49 statesof birth x 9 regions of
residence x 3 cohorts) slope coefficients, denoted In the second step, they relate these
coefficients to cohort effects, state-of-birth effects, region of residence effects, and measures of
state-average school quality for the particular cohort and state of birth. Their findings are
generally consistent with the estimates reported in our original paper (Card and Krueger, 1992a),
although their estimated school quality effects tend to be slightly larger. Their estimate of the
effect of school quality on the return to education is especially large in 1990, a year in which the
payoff to skills is considered to be at a very high level.
Heckman et al. next relate the state-of-birth intercepts to school quality measures for each
state and cohort. These results suggest that higher school quality is associated with a lower
251t is impressive to note that these estimates are obtained from a model that also inclUdes * large number of
other covariates.26
intercept, as in the theoretical model depicted in Figure 1. Card and Krueger (1992a, Figure 5)
founda similar result, although our analysis was somewhat complicated by the 2% threshold we
assumed in the education variable.
Their next extension is to include aggregate region-of-residence variables in their second-
stage model, to capture the effects of aggregate supply and demand factors on the return to
education. In this specification they remove the region of residence dummies (which would
absorb any regional variables) and include instead the regional means of the quality variables.
Onceihe regional quality means are included, the aggregate region-of-residence variables are
essentially orthogonal to the state-and-cohort specific quality measures, so the inclusion of the
aggregate variables has almost no effect on the estimated quality coefficients.
A fourth issue they address is non-random migration. If interstate mobility induces a
correlation between the state-of-birth-specific return to education and the quality of education,
then the second-step estimates may be biased.In Heckman et al. 's specification, biases
associated with inter-regional mobility are eliminated by including features of the region of origin
and region of residence in the second step equation. Specifically, Heckman et at. include a
quadratic in the distance between the region of birth and the region of residence. They
simultaneously free up the effect of school quality across regions by interacting the school quality
variables with a set of 9 region-of-residence dummies. Although they reject the hypothesis that
the pupil-teacher ratio has the same effect on the return to education in different regions, this
hypothesis cannot be rejected for teacher sa1ary. Furthermore, in almost all regions higher
school resources are associated with a higher return to education. To summarize these estimates,
1ndeed, the F-test for the teacher salary restrictions are far in the left tail of the distribution, with p-values
around 0.99.27
in Table 5wereport unweighted averages of the pupil-teacher coefficients for the nine Census
regions.3° The average pupil-teacher coefficients are generally similar to the coefficients from
more restrictive models that exclude the distance variables and impose constant quality effects
across regions. The only exception is 1990, when the average unrestricted quality coefficient is
three times larger than the restricted one. This pattern suggests that the assumptions of random
migration and constant returns to school quality across regions may lead to a downward bias in
the estimated effect of school quality.
Their fifth contribution is to relax the linearity assumption in the first step equation by
allowing for a piece-wise linear earnings-education relationship with discrete jumps at 12 and 16
years of education. Bach jump introduces an additional 76-120 parameters to be estimated in the
first step equation. They then relate the returns to education from these less-restrictive models
to the school quality variables. These results, which are reported in Table 12 of their paper,
show a weak and inconsistent pattern of the school quality variables at grade 12, but stronger
results at grade 16. Taken together, 13 of the 18 coefficients (2 grade levels x 3 Census years
x3quality variables) have the "right sign" for the hypothesis that higher school quality raises
the return to education --apattern that is unlikely to occur by chance. Nevertheless, the results
from the non-linear specifications are probably the weakest set of findings in Heckman et al. •S
studyof school quality effects. In our 1992a paper we similarly found that school quality had
small and inconsistent effects on earnings for those with exactly 12 years of schooling.
A critical issue in the interpretation of these results concerns the selectivity of schooling.
Although it may seem intuitively obvious that higher quality public schooling has its largest
The unweighted average represents the returnthat a personwould face who hadanequal probability of
moving to each region. Of course, one could use different weights.28
impact on students who go no further than high school, this intuition misses the fact that students
with better elementary and secondary education may be more likely to enter college.3' The
results described in the previous subsection and Heckman et al. 's findings (see row 7 of our
Table 4) suggest that higher school quality is associated with greater educational attainment. If
the "ability" of individuals at each level of education falls as school quality rises, we would
expect to see small or even zero effects of school quality on earnings for those with intermediate
levels of education, consistent with the nonlinear specifications reported by Heckman et al. In
our view, then, it is still an open question as to how to interpret the effect of school quality on
the level of earnings, conditional on education.
A sixth contribution of Heckman et al. is to provide nonparametric tests of the hypothesis
that average wages of individuals educated in different regions have the same rank-order across
different regional labor markets. The tests are carried out by cohort, conditional on various
levels of education. Taken as a whole the evidence in support of this hypothesis is weak.
Heckman et al. also correlate regional average quality measures with the mean wages of
individuals who were educated in different regions and observed working in a given region (by
education level and cohort). Again the correlations are weak. However, we suspect that these
tests have limited power, since school quality effects tend to be relatively small compared to the
background noise in earnings, and because the effects of school quality, conditional on education,
may be weak at middle levels of education.
As a final comment, we note that simple reduced form models of the effect of school
An analogy maybehelpful. It is arguable that advanced-level undergraduate courses yield the greatest benefit
for students who go on to graduate school. In an evaluation of an undergraduate program these benefits would be
missed if students who continued their training were excluded from the analysis.29
quality (i.e. Class IV models) may be quite useful in evaluating the overall effects of school
quality. Inferences about school quality effects from reduced form models do not depend on the
functional form of the earnings-education relationship, and incorporate any effect of school
quality on education attainment. It is also possible to estimate reduced form models for different
quantiles of the earnings distribution, revealing potential differences in the effect of school quality
for individuals in the lower or upper tails of the distribution. A limitation of reduced form
models is the presence of unobserved state-of-birth effects (or unobserved differences across
school districts) that may lead to biases in the correlation between school quality and earnings.
In our view, however, estimates from reduced form models are an important part of the collage
of evidence linking school quality and earnings.
Ill. The Measurement of School Ouality: Aggregation and Measurement Error
One of the key issues that arises in comparisons across the literature on school quality is
the unit of measurement for the quality variables. Several authors have argued that the use of
school quality measures at a higher level of aggregation (such as the district or state level) leads
to systematic upward biases in the estimated effects of school quality, relative to the use of
measures at the school level (e.g. Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor, 1995 and Betts, forthcoming).
On the other hand, the use of aggregated quality measures may overcome certain biases that arise
when quality is measured at a finer level. In this section we provide an overview of the tradeoffs
involved in the choice of different units of observation, and evaluate some of the evidence on the
relative biases associated with the alternative choices.
Conditional on observed educational attainment, a conceptually appropriate measure of30
school quality is the average quality of the schools (or classrooms) actually attended by a given
individual.32Without conditioning on observed education, however, the conceptually
appropriate definition of school quality is broader. An ideal measure of quality for an
unconditional analysis should take into account the quality of the schools potentially attended by
a given individual, and not just the quality of the classes or schools actually attended. Thus, in
reduced form (Class IV) models, or in models of educational attainment, the school quality
measures should reflect the quality of the overall school system available to an individual.
To evaluate the implications of using school quality measures at different levels of
aggregation, we begin with a simple reduced form (Class IV) specification of school quality
effects. Consider an individual (indexed by i) who attended or potentially attended "school
system" s in state b. Let Q,denotethe true average quality of this set of schools. Suppose that
log earnings of the individual (YIth) depend on a set of covariates (X,.) and on the true average
quality of the school system:
(10) Y = + +€.
LetQb represent an observed measure of quality, and write
Qth =Q"., +u,,,,
where UM,isa random measurement error satisfying the classical properties E(u,)=0 and
E(Q,u,)=0. Finally, decompose the error term €,as:
321t is usually assumed that the qualityofeach year of schooling exerts a constant influence on labor market
outcomes, so that an unweighted average of quality measures overtheeducational career is a valid index of quality.
If early education is more important than later education for determining lifetime opportunities, the quality of lower
levels of schooling should be more heavily weighted. The only systematic evidence we are aware of on this issue
comes from Wachtel (1976) who includes quality measures for primary and elementary schooling, as well as for
college, in a model for the earnings of men in the Thomdike-}Iagen sample who completed college (Wachtel, 1976,
Table 2, column 3). His estimates suggest that the effect of elementary and secondary schooling quality is
substantially larger than the effect of college quality.31
U,+,+
whereu, represents a shared error component for all individuals who attended school s in state
b, brepresentsan error component shared by all individuals from state b, and ,isa purely
idiosyncratic error.
Consider now an OLS estimator of Tthatuses the observed school-level quality variable.
Assuming that the school quality measurement error is orthogonal to t',,theasymptotic bias of
this estimator is
(11) -T(l-X)+ cov(vth,Q IXb)/var(Q1,IX1b)
+ cov(JLb,Qb Xb)/var(Q, Xth),
whereX =var(Q,)/var(Qth)represents the reliability of Q,;X,, representsthe mean value of
the covariates for students from school s; cov(u,,,Q, IX,,)represents the covariance of the
school-level error component UthandQ,,conditionalon X,, (i.e., having partialled out X,1, from
uk); var(Q,, IXb)represents the variance of Q,acrossschools, conditional on Xth; and
cov(jib,Qb IXb) representsthe covariance of the state-level error component bwithmean state-
level quality, conditional on the state-level means of the covariates (i.e., having partialled out the
state means Xb from b)
Thefirst term in this bias expression, -(l-X),represents the attenuation bias in the OLS
estimator attributable to the noise in the school-level quality variable. This can arise because Q
isonly measured for a subset of the schools attended by an individual who remained in the same
school system (e.g., only high school), or because some individuals move across school systems,
or from the fact that classroom sizes and teacher characteristics vary even within schools, or
from random reporting errors.32
The second term in the bias expression depends on the covariance of the school-level
error component in earnings with Q,.Animportant source of such a correlation is the
endogeneity of school quality. If children who would otherwise perform well in the labor market
(conditional on their observed X's) attend higher-quality schools, then this covariance will be
positive. This is the presumption in much of the literature, including Heckman, Layne-Farrar,
and Todd (1995a, section V). On the other hand, if school funding is allocated by compensatory
formulas this covariance will be negative. Interestingly, two recent studies of U.S. schooling
(Akerhielm, 1995 and Boozer and Rouse, 1995), and another recent study of Israeli schooling
(Lavy, 1995) all conclude that school resources are disproportionately targeted at the least able
students, leading to a systematic negative correlation between student outcomes and expenditure.
The third source of bias depends on the covariance between the state-level error
component in y, and state average quality. If children from different states have the same
distributions of unobserved productivity factors, controlling for their observable characteristics,
this term will be negligible. On the other hand, if children from states with higher quality
schools would tend to earn more regardless of school quality, this term will be positive.
An alternative estimator of the school quality effect iusesthe mean quality of schools
in each state as a proxy variable for Q.Considerthe projection of Q,onstate-level average
quality Qbandthe covariates included in equation (10):
Q,= aQ, +7X1 + va,.
In the absence of any individual-level or school-level X's, a will equal 1. More generally, a can
be bigger or less than 1, although the inclusion of micro-level X's that are correlated with school
quality (such as family income or parental education) would be expected to lead to a value of33
a < 1. Substituting this equation into (11) and taking probability limits, the asymptotic bias of
the school quality coefficient using state-level quality measures is
(12) (a-l)T +COV(J.tb,QbIXb)/var(Qb Xb),
whichdepends on (a-i), and on the covariance of the state-level error component in earnings
with state-level quality. In comparison to equation (11), however, the covariance ofb with Qb
is divided by the conditional variance of school quality across states, rather than the conditional
variance across schools. It is informative to re-write equation (12) as:
(12') (a-1)x + cov(jLb,QI, IXb)/var(Q, X,,)•R,
where R =var(QthXsb)/var(Qb IX)>1, represents the ratio of the variance in school quality
across schools to the variance across states, suitably adjusted for the covariates included in the
underlying model. For example, among white men in the NLS-Y data set we estimate that R
5forthe pupil-teacher ratio when Xconsistsof just an intercept.
A direct comparison of the biases in reduced-form estimators based on school-level and
state-level quality variables suggests that the state-level estimator will unambiguously dominate
(in terms of a smaller asymptotic bias) if a= 1 and COV(JLb,Qb IXb) = 0.If the latter condition
is not met, then thestimatorsare biased, and the relative comparison hinges on the magnitudes
of cov(JLb,Q, IXi,)and R, on the relative magnitudes of a and X,andon the school-level
covariance between quality and the unobserved error component in labor market outcomes.33
In particular, the estimator based on state-level data will have a smaller asymptotic bias if and
only if
33Althesigh some researchers have referred to the asymptotic bias in the estimator based on aggregate-level
school quality as aggregation bias this is IQtheconventional use of the term (e.g. Theil, 1971, p. 561). Rather,
aggregation eliminates some biases that exist in the micro-level estimates and magnifies others.34
coy(v,.QJX,)c.QjX) + > (R-1)
wzr(Q1JX) w,4Q,JX,)
Thisis more likely, the smaller is a relative to X, the smaller is R, and the smaller is the
coVanance between bandQb' conditional on the observed covariates.
Examination of the asymptotic bias in the estimator based on average quality at the state
level suggests a useful "specification check" for this estimator. Since the bias depends on
cov(jb,Q. Xb), the addition of other state-level variables that are correlated with the average
earnings of people from the state would be expected to lower the magnitude of the bias. Thus
a useful check in such models is to compare the magnitude of the estimated quality effects as
other aggregate control variables are added.34
A third estimator of equation (10) is an instrumental variables (IV) estimator that uses
state average quality measures as instruments for the school-level variables. To see the relation
between this estimator (),andone in which the state averages are inserted directly into the
reduced form earnings equation (i'),notethat= ?vg/a Thusthe IV estimate "corrects"
1.aVgforany deviation of a from 1, but has the same sign as rays35Ifa ￿1,as we suspect is
the case for most data sets, then the lv estimator will be larger (in absolute value) than the OLS
estimator using state averages. The IV estimator provides a consistent estimate of the true quality
effect if (and only if) cov(JLb,Ql,Xb)=0.
This approach was followed in Card and Krueger (1992a, Table 4) in the secoed step of a Class Ill model.
ln this light, the IV estimates reported by Betts (1995, footnote 29) are puzzling. He reports that the IV
estimate of the teacher-pupil effect, using the state-level teacher-pupil ratio as an instniment, is negative, while the
OLS estimate using the state average data is positive (Table 6,column1).35
MoreComplex School Ouality Models
The preceding discussion has focussed on reduced-form school quality models. Similar
issues of measurement error and bias also arise in more complex specifications, such as the Class
H and Class III models discussed in Section II. For example, consider a Class II model:
(13) Y =j3X. + pF+ OQ + + e,,,,
where E represents the years of education of individual i, educated in school system s in state
b (with quality Q).Asbefore, the error termcan be decomposed into a school-level
effect, a state-effect, and an idiosyncratic effect:
=U,, + Ib+Eith.
(Notethat these error components do not correspond to the errors in the reduced-form model
(10): we use the same notation only for simplicity). Estimation of (13) with observed quality
data leads to estimates of the quality effects 0andthat contain biases depending on the
reliability of the observed quality data, and on the covariances of individual education and school
quality with the unobserved error components of Y.
As with the reduced form models, it is also possible to estimate equation (13) using state-
level averages of quality.Given the biased standard errors that arise from micro-level
regressions that use aggregated explanatory variables, however, it may be more attractive to use
a two-step estimation method, as in Card and Krueger (l992a) and Heckman et al. The first step
estimates state-specific intercepts and education slopes; the second step regresses the state-specific
coefficients on state quality averages and other state-level data. Let &,representa state-specific
intercept, and letrepresent the average state-specific return to education coefficient. Then the
first-stage model can be written as:36
y, + ôb + 'Ybub+O(Q - Qb) + Qb)E + L),, + ,
where = +OQ,andlbp + s'Qb.The first step estimate of the return to education
in state b has probability limit
'Yb+ cov(E,,{ + v,&, + °(Q"th - Qb)+(Q - Qb)E, } ) /var(E),
where the variance and covariances are interpreted as "within state and conditional on X,, and
we have assumed that the measurement error in quality averages to zero within any state.
The covariance of E with the combined error component+ uthisequivalent to the
conventional "ability bias" component that is widely discussed in the literature on the return to
schooling (see Section I). This covariance will be positive if students who get more education
would tend to earn more anyway. The covariance of E with O(Q- Q"b)reflects a similar
effect, associated with non-random sorting of individuals to schools. If people who attended
higher quality schools in a given state tend to get more education, this term will be positive.
Finally, the covariance of education with Q1,)Ereflects a higher-order interaction that
may arise if the people who attended higher quality schools within a state have a higher return
to education and acquire more education.
In the second step of the analysis, the estimated state-specific education slopes are
regressed on measured state-level average quality variables. Ignoring sampling error, this will
recover a coefficient estimate equal to (the true effect of quality on the return to education) 1u
aterm reflecting the covariation across states between average school quality and the state-
specific bias in the estimated return to education. The asymptotic bias in the first stage estimate
of the return to schooling in state b is
cov(E, {, +u,+O(Q", -Q'b) + Q"b)E}) / var(E).37
If this bias is either constant across states, or uncorrelated with average school quality, the two-
step estimator of will be asymptotically unbiased.36
An important observation about the first stage estimates of the return to education is that
under the null hypothesis that O=ço=O (i.e., assuming that the true effects of school quality are
zero) the bias in the estimated return to schooling for people from state b is
cov(E,+I var(E).
This expression will be orthogonal to quality differences across states under fairly plausible
assumptions. For example, one sufficient condition is that the joint distribution of individual
"ability" (,+u)withthe idiosyncratic determinants of the cost of education is the same
across different states. Under this assumption, even though the returns to education for each
state are upward-biased, a regression of the estimated returns on state-level school quality
variables provides a valid test of the null hypothesis.
More generally, estimates of the state-specific returns to education are purged of the
"standard" sources of bias in the measured relationship between school quality and the level of
earnings, such as unobserved differences in family background or community-level characteristics
(that concern Hanushek, Rivkin, and Taylor, 1995). These factors are absorbed by the
unrestricted state effects in the first-stage model and will complicate any inferences about the
effect of school quality on the intercepts of the earnings-schooling relationship. But the bias in
p is determined by a higher order omitted variable. For a to be asymptotically biased, omitted
variables must be correlated with the interaction after controlling for the effects of
We are ignoring biases that might arise if there is some slippage in the identification of which state an
individual attended school. As shown in Card and Knieger (l992a), this is a problem in Census data, where state
of birth must be used to infer where an individual attended school. We estimate that this bias attenuates the
coefficients of school quality by 5-15percent.38
education and school quality (or unrestricted state dummies). It is unclear which direction, if
any, these omitted effects might bias the estimated impact of school quality on the return to years
of education. Most of the intuition for this problem, and assertions in the literature, come from
simpler reduced form models. However, the fact that the variables that Card and Krueger
(1992a, Table 6) and Heckman et al. add to equation (8) do not substantively change the
estimates ofsuggeststhat these higher-order bias terms may be small.
IV. Lessons from the Experiences of Southern-Born Blacks
A final aspect of the link between school quality and earnings that is worth considering
in more detail is the unique experience of African American children who were schooled in the
segregated school systems of the South.Racially segregated schooling led to profound
differences in school resources available to black and white children, and among black children
educated in different states. In 1915, for example, the 18 jurisdictions with legally segregated
schools had an average pupil-teacher ratio of 61 in black schools and 38 in white schools. By
the 1953-54 school year, on the eve of the Brown versus Board of Education decision, the
average pupil-teacher ratio fell to 32 in black schools and 28 in white schools. The differences
in school quality were also enormous across states. For example, in 1953-54 the average pupil-
teacher in black schools wasin Mississippi and 27 in Kentucky.
A particularly revealing comparison is provided by two neighboring states: North Carolina
and South Carolina. Figure 3 shows the pupil-teacher ratio for black and white schools each year
in South Carolina and North Carolina for most of the century. Although these two states are
similar in many respects, they differed dramatically in the resources they provided for schooling,39
especially for black children. Whereas North Carolina was among the most progressive of the
non-border Southern states vis-a-vis black schooling, South Carolina was among the least
progressive (see Harlan, 1958). By comparison, schools for whites were actually better funded
in South Carolina than in North Carolina throughout the first half of the century. In both states,
the pupil-teacher ratios in black and white schools converged to about the same level by the late
1960s.
Bond (1934) and others have observed that in areas where blacks were more numerous,
a greater share of school resources were diverted from the black schools to white schools. An
exclusionary political system enabled this discrimination to persist until the 1960s (see Boozer,
Krueger and Wolkon, 1992). South Carolina and North Carolina are consistent with this pattern,
as South Carolina had a much higher proportion of blacks in its population than North
Carolina.37 Compared to white families, black families had much less discretion over the level
of school resources in the segregated states. To the extent that the endogenous determination of
school resources (i.e., a correlation between school resources and omitted variables) is a problem
for studies based on samples of white workers, this is much less of a problem for estimates based
on black workers who were educated during the segregation era.
In Card and Krueger (1992b), we utilize the large inter-state differences in the pupil-
teacher ratio and other resources in the black and white schools in the first half of the century,
as well as changes in resources across cohorts, to estimate the impact of school quality on
earnings. To control for differential labor market effects, in much of our analysis we focused
on workers who attended school in the South but later were observed working in a common set
7mi5 difference reflected in part the historically different cropping patterns in the two states -seeFogel and
Engetman (1974).40
of Northern labor markets. This technique has the advantage of controlling for labor market
differences that may be correlated with school quality differences: for example, states that
discriminated in terms of school resources may be more likely to allow discrimination in terms
of labor market conditions. We related the payoff to a year of schooling by racial group for
individuals who were educated in different states to the quality of the educational resources
available to students of that racial group at the time they attended school (i.e., Class III models).
The results indicate that the payoff to education is greater for individuals (of either racial group)
who were born in states that devoted more resources to education.
Figure 4 displays the relationship between the differential "return to education" between
blacks and whites and the black-white difference in the pupil-teacher ratio for men born from
1910 to 1939. The downward-sloping relationship signifies that the differential payoff to a year
of education was greatest for those from states where black schools lagged furthest behind white
schools in terms of class size. Similar results are found when we focus just on black workers,
rather than on the black-white difference. Moreover, when we estimate separate models for
blacks and whites from the segregated states, we are not able to reject the hypothesis that the
effect of school quality on the return to education is the same for both racial groups.
The South Carolina-North Carolina comparison provides additional evidence that the
returns to education reflected the differences in quality. As noted, the quality of black schools
was higher in North Carolina than in South Carolina, while the reverse was true for white
schools throughout most of the century (see Figure 3). For blacks, the estimated payoff to a year
of education in 1980 was 2.1 percent for those born in South Carolina and 4.0 percent for those
born in North Carolina; while for whites the order of the returns was reversed: 6.6 percent for41
SouthCarolinaand 6.0 percent for North Carolina. Thus, for these two states the differences
in the payoff to education accord fairly well with the differences in the resources devoted to
education.38
Because the analysis described so far is based on individuals who were educated (actually,
born) in the South and then observed working elsewhere, the validity of our inferences depends
on the migration decisions of the workers. To the extent that these decisions are correlated with
the payoff to education (conditioning on the payoff to education in the labor market where the
individuals work) and the quality of individuals' schooling, the estimated effects of school quality
may be biased. We suspect that a consideration of the nature of black mobility from the South
would lead to the conclusion that patterns of earnings and school quality among migrants tend
to underestimate any school quality effects with estimated with state-level quality data. Most
research suggests that Southern out-migrants were better educated than non-migrants (e.g.,
Margo, 1990). More generally, people with higher overall productivity (including both the level
and quality of education, as well as other unobserved components of productivity)may have been
more likely to leave the South. Thus, low-educated blacks who migrated from states with low
average school quality --forexample, Mississippi --arelikely to have had higher levels of
unobserved ability and to have attended schools with above-average school quality within the
state. In this scenario, the unobserved components of ability and school quality for individuals
in our sample will be negatively correlated with measured school quality, biasing downwardany
38A similar comparison is also possible between whiteandblack students born in Virginia and West Virginia.
White schools in the early part of this century had lower pupil-teacher ratios in Virginia than WestVirginia, while
the reverse was tree for black schools. Consistent th the school qualityhypothesis, the estimated returns to
schooling are higher for whites born in Virginia than West Virginia, while the returns are higher for black born in
West Virginia than Virginia.42
effect of school quality.
More direct evidence that selective migration is not driving our findings comes from
reduced form models estimated on samples of all workers from a given state, including those
who moved out of state and those who did not. In our 1992b paper we related the gap in
average weekly earnings between blacks and whites from each state to the gap in average school
quality between blacks and whites that existed in the state during the years the workers would
have attended school. The results are consistent with our findings based on differences in the
returns the education: earnings are higher for groups from states with higher quality schooling.
According to the reduced form estimates, a reduction of the pupil-teacher ratio by 10 students
is associated with nearly 3 percent higher weekly earnings during each year of one's working
life. Notice also that this approach reflects any effect of school quality on the level of education,
on the payoff to a year of education, and on the intercept.
In summary, we believe that evidence based on patterns of school quality and earnings
for Southern-born black workers provides further confirmation of a link between school resources
and labor market success. Because of the wide variation in school quality available to black
children in different states and at different times, and because of the arguably exogenous --and
certainly different --natureof the resource decisions that affected black students, this evidence
is especially valuable. The estimated effects of school quality on earnings of Southern-born
blacks educated before the mid-1960s are consistent with the estimates obtained in the rest of the
literature.
V. Conclusions43
Our review of the literature reveals a high degree of consistency across studiesregarding
the effect of school quality on students subsequent earnings. The literaturesuggests that a 10
percent increase in school spending is associated with a 1 to 2 percent increase in earnings for
students later in their lives. The studies estimate a widerange of specifications, and hold
constant a number of different variables, including IQ, parental income, and parental education.
Nonetheless, it is possible that school quality is only spuriously correlated with earnings asa
result of unobserved background factors that affect school resources and student outcomes. Class
III studies, which identify the effect of education on the of the earnings-education
relationship, are the least susceptible to such biases because the inclusion of unrestricted state
effects eliminates the influence of omitted state-level characteristics. Most studies that estimate
Class ifi models tend to find a positive effect of school quality on the payoff toa year of
education, once fixed state effects are removed.
Another finding in the literature is that educational attainment is positively related to
school quality. This finding holds in several data sets, including those that measurequality at
the state, district and school level. It is also consistent with a simple model thatpredicts that
students will invest in more years of education if they perceive that higherquality schooling
increases the payoff to each additional year of education.
Some authors have argued that the positive effects of school quality on earnings and
educational attainment estimated in much of the literature are a spurious result ofusing
aggregated school quality data. To support this argument, they point to studies using school-level
quality data that often (although not always) find a statistically insignificant relationship between
school quality and earnings. Our review casts doubt on this conclusion. The small number of44
data sets that have information on workers' earnings and the quality of school they attended have
three features in common that limit their usefulness: they include only young workers (often in
their early 20s); they have school quality for just one year (typically a year during high school);
and they have relatively small samples. Wachtel (1975) finds that the return to school quality
increases as workers gain experience, and similar results have been found for the return to years
of education. School quality in a given year is an imprecise measure of the student's history of
school quality, leading to potential attenuation biases. Perhaps most importantly, the small
sample sizes of these data sets lead to imprecise estimates that cannot distinguish between small
buteconomicallyimportant differences in school quality effects that are estimated with
comparable specifications using more aggregative quality data in larger data sets. For example,
reduced form estimates based on the NLS-Y do not reject even the largest estimates of
comparable specifications in the previous literature. Furthermore, when state-level average
quality is used in place of school-level data in these studies, the estimates are even less precise,
and often have the wrong sign, suggesting that the use of aggregated quality measures does not
automatically lead to upward-biased quality effects.
Our reading of the literature leads us to suggest several directions for future research that
may help resolve some of the remaining puzzles regarding the link between school quality and
earnings:
(1) As suggested by Wachtel (1975), we hypothesize that the labor market returns to school
quality tend to be lower for younger workers and to rise with experience. This can be tested by
examining young cohorts of workers (e.g., age 17-3 1) in Census data, or by following cohorts45
in the NLS-Y, High School and Beyond, and similar data sets as they age.
(2) As Heckman et al. and Card and Krueger (1992a) find, the precise form of the earnings-
school quality relationship exerts an important influence on the estimated effects of school
quality. For example, these studies conclude that school quality has a weak and inconsistent
effect on earnings of those with exactly 12 years of schooling. Conditioning on education is
inappropriate, however, if schooling attainment is affected by school quality, and if people with
higher education would tend to earn more even without more schooling. Our theoretical model
suggests that such unobserved ability biases will lead the observed earnings-schooling relationship
to rotate as school quality increases --aprediction that is consistent with findings in Heckman
et al. and our earlier study.
(3) Reduced form models incorporate the effects of school quality on both educational attainment
and the shape of the earnings-schooling relationship. For this reason, we recommend that
researchers report such models and compare the reduced form estimates with their other
specifications. Nevertheless, reduced form models may be susceptible to omitted variable biases.
Perhaps the only way to fully overcome the problems of inferring the net effects of school quality
is through randomized experiments. In the meantime, "natural" experiments that generate large
and more-or-less exogenous shifts in school resources, such as the system of segregated schooling
in the South, may provide the strongest evidence on school quality and labor market outcomes.
Our conclusion that most studies of labor market outcomes show a positive effect of46
school quality is in apparent conflict with the widely-held view that school resources have little
or no impact on students' test scores (e.g., Hanushek, 1986). We do not think this conflict is
resolved by concluding that the relationship between school quality and earnings is spurious.
Instead, we believe that the following observations are relevant:
(1) Test scores are not strong predictors of students' success in the labor market, so the finding
that school resources have a low association with test scores does not imply that school resources
have a low association with earnings.39 Test scores may be a poor indicator of what is learned
in school and subsequently rewarded in the labor market. And students' performance on tests
while they are in school may be a poor indicator of what is retained years later, when the
students are in the labor market.
(2) The conclusion that school inputs have no effect on test scores is open to question. Many
of the individual studies in the literature have low power, even though as a group the studiesmay
have power. Indeed, Hedges's (1993) mets-analysis suggests that school quality does affect test
scores. Although one can criticize the assumptions that underlie any mets-analysis, one must
bear in mind that similar assumption are implicit in other quantitative summaries of the literature.
A recent experiment in which students were randomly assigned to large and small classes in
Tennessee found that students tended to do perform better on tests if they were assigned to small
classes (e.g., Mosteller, 1995).
This pointwas made byJohnson and Stafford (1973) over 20 years ago, who wrote: "Are our empirical
findings necessarily inconsistent with thoec of several authors who argue that the quality of schooling has little effect
on output measures such as tests of cognitive skills? We think not. First, there is to our knowledge no precise link
betwe test scores and earnings.47
(3) Because educational attainment appears to be related to school quality, thetype of selection
issues that arise in the literature on earnings may also arise in the literatureon test scores. In
particular, marginal students who benefit from improved school qualitymay be less likely to drop
out or be held back a grade. Therefore, studies of the relationship betweentest scores and
school quality that condition on grade level may be biased towardfinding no effect of school
quality. This issue can be investigated by estimating reduced form models that conditionon age,
but not grade level.References
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3. Morgenstern 1968 Urban Problems
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high school provided by school













Class IV. School data from survey
of latest high school attended in
1979. Other controls includeteacher
salary, teacher educ., region of


















Notes: The sign was changed for studies that used the teacher-pupil ratio. A negative coefficient means
that higher earnings are associated with a tower pupil-teacher ratio. The elasticities were calculated at
assusing the pupil-teacher ratio equaLs 17.9. Estimated standard errors are shownin parentheses.Table 3: Impact of Pupil-Teacher Ratio on Return to a Year of Schooling
WithoutStateWith State
Model Effects(ab) Effects (c,)
Card and Krueger (1992a) 2% Threshold: -0.40 -1.59
(0.28) (0.54)
Linear Model: -0.20 -1.37
(0.27) (0.52)
Card and Krueger (1992b) Linear Model: -1.44 -1.25
(0.39) (0.54)











State Avg. Quality: 5.30
(6.79)
Notes:
Estimate is the change in the percentage return to one year of education for a one
percent change in the pupil-teacher ratio. Estimated standard errors are shown in
parentheses. The state effects (°b) are in the return to education (see text).
Because Betts uses the teacher-pupil ratio as his explanatory variable, the negative
sign was taken. In this table, a negative estimate indicates that reducing the pupil-
teacher ratio increases the slope of the earnings-education function. Calculations























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: Column 1 of Tables 7 a,b,c and Tables 14 a,b,c of
Heckman et al.